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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

LOGCAP: THE NATION'S PREMIER CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING PROGRAM FOR FORCE XXI

BY

MARILYN HARRIS
Department of the Army

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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by

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ABSTRACT

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LOGCAP: The Nation's Premier Contingency Contracting Program For Force XXI

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Doctrine, so long in coming has finally been published on the use of contractors on the battlefield and guidance for contracting support on the battlefield, but the doctrine has not gone far enough. The time has come to formally institutionalize the use of contractors on the battlefield by expanding the use of the Logistic Civil Augmentation Program. LOGCAP is the Army's premier umbrella contract to provide logistics support on the battlefield. The institutionalization of the Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program into a program for all services is Department of Defense's best available solution for a seamless integration of contractors onto the battlefield. The cultural challenge is planning for its use in the joint strategic, operational and tactical planning process. Taking the next step to insure that it is the first called in a contingency is another step toward a more efficient theater support operation.

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LOGCAP: THE NATION'S PREMIER CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING PROGRAM FOR FORCE XXI

The institutionalization of the Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program is Department of Defense's best available solution for a seamless integration of contractors on the battlefield. The challenge is to include its use in strategic, operational and tactical plans. This is theory, but theory has its place. Clausewitz offered a practical approach to the contribution of the theorist:

Theory will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyse the constituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely what at first sight seems fused, to explain in full the properties of the means employed and to show their probable effects, to define clearly the nature of the ends in view and to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical enquiry. Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and it helps him avoid pitfalls.... But it could never tell him exactly what to do.¹

The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract has now been through two iterations. This year, plans are being made to issue requests for proposals for the follow-on contract. These contracts typically stay in place for five years. The LOGCAP concept is to pre-plan for the use of global corporate resources to support contingency operations worldwide by augmenting combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) force structure capabilities. The time is right to expand its current scope, to break the paradigm of each command entering theater with its own organic contracting officers, of multiple providers in a theater of operations. The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program has been tested and honed and it is ready.

While the program has experienced its peaks and valleys during the fifteen years since it was conceived and the eight years since the contract was first awarded, most agree that it has been an overall success. In December 1992, just four months after the first comprehensive multifunctional LOGCAP umbrella support contract was awarded, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, then the executive agent for the contract used Brown & Root Services, Inc. (BRSC) as the LOGCAP contractor to support all U.S. and UN forces in Somalia. The battlefield-experienced contractor rose to the occasion and accomplished the mission as required.

Commanders are always concerned with protecting their center of gravity and logistics is always a potential center of gravity. One great concern when this contract was awarded was whether it would become a replacement for the force. The Army clearly stated its purpose when awarding this contract that it was to be an augmentation to the force structure, a force multiplier, but not a replacement. Next came the inevitable cultural denial and the historical disconnects between government and contractor. Once tested and found to be good, some commanders overindulged in what the contractor brought to the table. To some observers, these were "growing pains;" to others, it was a bit more serious. Without adequate planning and communication, the Army and other government agencies could inadvertently require the contractor to perform services outside the scope of the contract. In a contingency operations environment like Bosnia, this easily resulted in significant cost overruns, the type that captured the attention of Government Accounting Office (GAO), Army Audit Agency (AAA), the Inspector General (IG)

and Congress. The image of the LOGCAP contractor ran the gamut from "money grubbing profiteer" to invaluable resource. Nevertheless, the United States Army Europe (USAREUR) became enamored of BRSC's performance. So much so that when the follow-on, less expensive contract was awarded to DynCorp, USAREUR severed ties with the prescribed Department of the Army (DA) LOGCAP contract in favor of a more expensive, more restrictive, but-already-in-place sole source contract with BRSC. However, it is important to recognize that the commander tested contractors on the battlefield and found it to be good—very good.

RECURRING ISSUES OF USE OF CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD

Many important issues have been raised about the use of contractors on the battlefield in general and LOGCAP specifically. The Army's need to use systems and contingency support contractors on the battlefield stretched far ahead of doctrine available to guide their use. In fact, this goes to the heart of a commander's concerns for his centers of gravity—morale, force protection and command and control. In a Landpower Essay Series paper written in 1995, Raymond Sumser and Charles Hemingway raised international, national, joint and Army specific issues. Some of these included questions like:

- > "Are civilians who accompany the force combatants or noncombatants?
- > Should Congress change the current Uniform Code of Military Justice to extend court-martial jurisdiction over civilian employees and civilian contractors?
- > Should the combatant commander actively determine the civilian "mix" needed with the force?
- > Who "owns" the civilians once they are deployed to the area or theater of operation?
- > Who processes contractor employees for deployment? Who pays?
- > What uniforms, indicia or insignia do contractor employees wear while in theater?"4

In the summer of 1999 the Army published guidance to respond to the recurring issues raised concerning the use of contractors on the battlefield in Field Manual (FM) 100-10-2, "Contracting Support on the Battlefield" and Army Regulation (AR) 715-10 "Army Contractors on the Battlefield." The publication of this doctrine institutionalizes the concept of contractors on the battlefield, provides assistance to Major Commands (MACOMs) and assigns responsibilities to Army organizations in the use of contractor support. But while the new guidance goes a long way to address most of these very important concerns, the issue of multiple contingency contracting entities in a theater has not been adequately addressed, in my opinion.

BACKGROUND

The use of civilian contractors to supply the logistical needs of armies in the field is a very old practice. From ancient times to the present, governments have relied on private citizens and commercial firms to supply the "sinews of war." In an article from the *Army Logistician*, James Althouse quoted Martin van Cleveld in <u>Supplying War</u>, that early commanders realized the need to furnish their armies with supplies beyond what they could plunder. They did this through the use of sutlers that were paid to bring supplies to the Army. ⁶

When the U.S. Army was established in 1775, American military leaders were already accustomed to using contractors to fulfil the needs of troops engaged in battle. Since 1775, contractors have always accompanied America's armies on the battlefield, both at home and abroad. Contractors provided food, clothing, shelter, transport, labor and general housekeeping.

The Army's experience with contractors in the Revolutionary War is recorded to have contained many of the same elements that would characterize its later experiences with contractors on the battlefield. The results were mixed regarding performance and provision of adequate support for the troops. Notable concerns then as now, were lack of experience and expertise on the part of Army officers in dealing with contractors and lack of clarity in communications between the Army and contractors as to requirements, capabilities, and costs. Nevertheless, 1783 generally accepted the system of private contractors, and it would remain the primary system for providing the fledging U.S. Army with food, forage, fuel and clothing, equipment, weapons, transport and additional labor, both in garrison and in the field, for many years to come.⁷

With the creation of the Army Quartermaster Corps in the early 1900's the need for contractors was significantly reduced, but not eliminated. In World War II manufacturers' technical representatives began appearing in forward areas of the battlefield. In the Korean War, the Army hired Japanese and Korean contractors to provide labor, stevedoring, road and rail maintenance and supply services. As a result, the manpower savings for the Army were significant. Historians have estimated that without Japanese labor, the Army would have required nearly a quarter of a million more troops. In "The Sinews of War: Army Logistics," James Huston wrote that "without Korean workers in Korea, it would doubtless have been necessary for the U.S. forces to assign whole divisions of combat troops to the supply lines."

By the time the U.S was firmly entrenched in Vietnam, contractors on the battlefield had become a major force multiplier. There, in the zone of operations, contractors were primarily used in construction, base operations, water and ground transport, petroleum supply and technical and maintenance support. Because of the lack of skilled labor in Vietnam, contractors often hired U.S. and third country nationals. By 1969 there were an estimated 52,000 contractor personnel in Vietnam. Pentagon and GAO records estimate that during the Persian Gulf War there were 9200 contractors and 5200 civilians deployed to support a military force of 541,000.

LOGCAP contractors supported operations in Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti arriving in theater just a few days after first U.S. troops. Today, LOGCAP and other contractors are supporting the force in too many locations to itemize including the Sinai, Bosnia, Hungary, Croatia, Macedonia, and East Timor.

The use of civilian contractors is becoming more and more an accepted and expected means of augmenting Army logistical capabilities, especially in contingency operations conducted on short notice. Reductions in defense budgets, in the Army's logistical force in general and the historical success in the use of contractors on the battlefield led to the establishment of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).

NEW GUIDANCE ON USE OF CONTINGENCY CONTRACTORS AND CONTRACTING (LOGISTICS) SUPPORT ON THE BATTLEFIELD

Contingency contracting provides support through contracts with United States, host nation or third country businesses or vendors, in support of contingency operations. Typically, contracting organizations from the deploying commands award on-the-ground contracts as the contingency operation unfolds. Battlefield contracting is used to supplement not replace the existing supply system or organic support. During the initial weeks of an operation, contingency contracting officers contract for much of the required life and mission related support until Combat Service Support (CSS) units arrive in theater or until the LOGCAP contractor can establish operations in theater. ¹⁰

Lessons learned through recent military operations like Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrate that contracting and outsourcing can be effective force multipliers. Contracted capability can increase or decrease available support resources quickly in response to changing requirements. It can extend existing military capability, provide alternative sources of supplies and services, or provide capabilities for which no military capability exists.

In an article from the *Army Logistician* magazine, Joe Fortner and Ron Jaeckle, two of the framers of TRADOC's new doctrine discuss institutionalizing contractors on the battlefield. They maintain that except for LOGCAP contracts, the Army's use of contracted support has been focused on individual contracts developed as required. Now, for the first time, the Army is beginning to look at institutionalizing contracts and using contractors on the battlefield for routine military operations.¹¹

COMPETING FOR RESOURCES—LESSONS LEARNED?

In his May 1999 Landpower Series Essay, Charles Shrader described Operation Joint Endeavor as "the largest and most complex logistical effort undertaking by the United States Army Europe (USAREUR) since World War II and stated that the effort was made possible by the participation of a number of civilian contractors...."

However, the number of contracting organizations, contracting officers, interests and agencies grew to be nearly counterproductive as these contracting interests competed against each other for limited local resources and increased the costs of goods and services. It is not difficult to see how this could happen. FM 100-10-2 explains the structure of contracting in a theater:

The COSCOM provides support, including contracting support, to the corps force and to other units, services and allies as directed.... Multiple units throughout a corps—COSCOM, corps support groups, Force Provider companies, and select transportation detachments, as well as the division support command (DISCOM) with divisions all have organic contingency contracting personnel who operate under the provisions of the theater and corps contracting support plans.... In addition, several commands with separate and distinct contracting authority operate on the battlefield....[These] theater support contractors support deployed operational forces under pre-arranged contracts or contracts awarded from the mission area. They provide goods, services and minor construction usually from the local vendor base.... ¹³

FM 100-10-2 centralizes all contracting authority and activity under the theater's Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) through his designee, the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC). This is a daunting task in a large theater or a joint environment. By their own admission, the framers of the FM recognize that "senior commanders always want their direct support under their command" and that "this principle of centralized control and management of contracting elements seems to contradict that desire."

The FM requires an acquisition review board (ARB) which will review requirements for contracting support against the Commander in Chief's or Army Subordinate Component Commands' (CINC/ASCC's) established contracting support plans and priorities. The senior commander would convene this board to screen requirements, provide input to priorities and determine allocation of resources. During this process, the board determines whether a requirement should be satisfied through host nation support, LOGCAP, contingency contract support or other contracting sources. ¹⁵

This has the appearance of a very cumbersome process that would take an inordinate amount of a senior commander's valuable time in a theater of operations, especially early in a deployment. The new doctrine may not have gone far enough in reducing the number of contracting offices competing for the same local resources in a theater of operations. We learned from Operations Desert Storm and Joint Guard that competing requirements can have an impact on efficiency and on a commander's oversight of the theater.

There are benefits to using only the LOGCAP contractor to support the theater of operations. While the support that the LOGCAP contractor provides for deployed operational forces is often separate and distinct from either theater support or systems contractors, it is designed to be nearly all encompassing. The Defense Contract Management Command International (DCMDI) whose authority comes from its own chain of command administers this umbrella contract. The LOGCAP contractor is better prepared than most of the organic contracting entities in theater because the contract requires them to maintain a worldwide "warm" vendor database to support virtually every MACOM plan. The contractor is able to "hit the ground running" in terms of vendor sources of support.

THE LOGISTICS CIVIL AUGMENTATION PROGRAM AS THE ARMY'S CONTINGENCY CONTRACTOR

The time has come to push the formal institutionalization of contractors on the battlefield by expanding the use of the Logistic Civil Augmentation Program. Taking the next step to insure that it is the first called and the single contractor in a contingency is another step toward a more efficient theater support operation. LOGCAP is the Army's umbrella contract and should be the one major contract employed in contingency operations. The concept was established in December 1985 with the publication of AR 700-137. LOGCAP was used in 1988 when the Third U.S. Army (TUSA) asked the first executive agent for the contract, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) for a management plan to construct and maintain two petroleum pipeline systems in support of contingency operations in Southwest Asia. When LOGCAP supported all U.S. and UN forces in Somalia, the contractor was no stranger to the battlefield

contracting arena. Brown & Root Services Corporation (BRSC) was a descendent of the firm Richardson-Morrison-Knudsen-Brown-Root-Jacobsen (RMK-BRJ), one of the principal construction contractors used in Vietnam. BRSC, one of the top ten U.S. government contractors, is a subsidiary of Houston based Brown & Root, Inc. a part of the Halliburton Company of Dallas, headed since 1985 by former Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney. In 1997, following an intensive investigation of cost overruns in USAREUR and acknowledgment of many lessons learned, the Army named the Army Materiel Command (AMC) as its executive agent for the follow-on LOGCAP contract that was awarded to DynCorp of Reston, VA. ¹⁶

In Operation Joint Endeavor, 1995-1996, the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) made use of LOGCAP for the first time. As the LOGCAP contractor, BRSC began providing support for Operation Joint Endeavor in Hungary, Bosnia, and Croatia in November 1995. This support included a wide range of services including base camp construction, transportation, distribution of water, POL, food service, laundry, showers, latrines, trash and garbage removal, contingency equipment and unskilled labor. While the initial contract required only eight base camps, BRSC aided by the U.S. Air Force and Navy construction engineers, eventually built more than twenty-five base camps to accommodate more than 20,000 troops in Bosnia and Croatia. Although by December 1996, the primary contract in support of Operation Joint Endeavor cost nearly 481 million dollars, USAREUR reported that the use of BRSC and other contractors resulted in significant cost savings. ¹⁷

The umbrella contract maintains on a regional basis, a worldwide contract to plan for and execute support to deployed forces. Activated upon approval of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), this contract is referred to as a contingency support contract because it is planned and managed like a support contract, but utilized only in support of contingency operations. Managed by AMC, the LOGCAP team consists of Army (Lieutenant Colonel) planners, Department of the Army Civilians, Logistics Support Element (LSEs) personnel and contractors who help commanders to pre-plan for contracting support. During the initial weeks of contingency operations, LOGCAP can deploy into theater with 72 hours of the contracting officer's notice to proceed (NTP). The goals of LOGCAP are to:

- > Plan during peacetime for effective use of contractor support in a contingency.
- Leverage global/regional corporate resources as facility and logistic services shortfalls.
- Provide an alternative augmentation capability to meet facility and logistic services shortfalls.
- Provide a quick reaction to contingency requirements.

LOGCAP is designed for use primarily in areas where no multilateral or bilateral agreements or treaties exist. Conceptually the contract is to be used when contractor support can be an effective, expeditious or cost effective method to augment organic CS/CSS capabilities. The genesis of LOGCAP is to accommodate the mandatory force reduction; enable the Army to continue to support multiple missions; provide an additional logistics facility alternative for the commander; and reserve combat forces for higher priority missions.¹⁸

LOGCAP has not been without its growing pains; but it is this process of growing and learning lessons that has prepared the program for its place as the premier contingency contract. But planning is

essential. Of all the lessons learned, planning has been cited again and again as the key to success in using contracted support on the battlefield. For a variety of reasons, mostly cultural, military planners have not routinely planned extensively for the use of contractor augmentation and support in OPLANs and CONPLANs. AR 715-10 now requires MACOM commanders to include their contracting requirements in the deliberate planning process. FM 100-10-2 provides guidance on what functions can be considered in planning for use of contractors and how to integrate these functions into the planning process. In developing the original Statement of Work (SOW) for the LOGCAP contract, DA prepared the way for MACOM/ASCC planners to incorporate LOGCAP options into strategic, operational and planning processes. The concept of LOGCAP has always been to pre-plan in peacetime for its use in contingency operations.

Recognizing that the U.S. Army is the best in the world because it trains the way it fights the creators of the original concept envisioned a team that would have military planners and contractor planners matched with specific MACOM areas of responsibilities (AORs). Team LOGCAP would coordinate with "their" MACOMs to assist in developing LOGCAP support plans to meet logistic support requirements for their OPLANs. Additionally, the creators envisioned a program where Team LOGCAP would participate in MACOM exercises. DA funding is authorized to pay for plan development and exercise participation. This allows the Team to develop a habitual relationship with the MACOM, demonstrate contractor capabilities and provide training for support personnel. This worked well in theory but LOGCAP planners often found coordination with the appropriate MACOM planner difficult. LOGCAP planners were sometimes even less successful in convincing MACOMs of the value of LOGCAP participation in exercises. Nevertheless, where LOGCAP has participated, the response has been positive. The struggle is cultural; paradigms don't shift easily or quickly. But over time, these problems have begun to fade. The more LOGCAP is successfully deployed and given the opportunity to prove itself, the better accepted the next time.

The annual LOGCAP Worldwide Requirements Conference brings the MACOMs together with Team LOGCAP and provides a forum for MACOM representatives to discover how they can be supported. MACOM planners are invited and asked to bring their annual requirements for LOGCAP support plans as well as candidates for LOGCAP participation in exercise training. These plan requirements are discussed, integrated into a prioritized list and turned over to the DCSLOG for funding approval.

STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL PLANNING FOR LOGISTICS

The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program supports the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy and Joint Operations planning. This umbrella contract awarded by the Army has been tested and found to be a force multiplier that can be included in strategic, operational and tactical plans as a viable support to the commander. LOGCAP supports the Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations (Joint Pub 4.0) and the Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations (Joint Pub 5.0). New doctrine answers many questions about how the commander may include the Army's institutional contract in the

scope of joint operation planning including the activities of mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment and redeployment planning.

The President's critical goals as stated in the National Security Strategy are to enhance security by marketing a strong defense, to bolster prosperity by working to open foreign markets and spur economic growth, and to promote democracy. The President said in the National Security Strategy that the U.S must have the tools to carry out this strategy. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) struck a careful balance between near term readiness, long-term modernization and quality of life improvements for men and women in uniform. It insured that the high readiness levels of our forward deployed and first to fight troops would be maintained. LOGCAP can improve the quality of life of troops deployed anywhere in the world. The program's focus on planning, readiness and responsiveness supports and enhances the readiness levels of our deployed and first to fight troops. Additionally, its use of global corporate resources supports the industrial base.

In the National Military Strategy, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, General Shalikasvili said, "It is important to emphasize the Armed Forces' core competencies...we fight." "That," he said, "must be the primary consideration in the development and employment of forces. The force levels recommended by the Secretary and the QDR are the minimum to carry out this strategy at prudent risk. To do this with forces that will remain committed to operational readiness, contingency operations and engagement activities requires... a fundamental re-engineering of support infrastructure." Using contractors on the battlefield as a part of the logistic support structure provides the theater commander with a force multiplier that will free warfighting soldiers from tasks that can easily be accomplished by civilian contractors. It also allows for a smoother exit strategy from humanitarian operations than might be possible with only uniformed personnel. General John Shalikashvili said of the LOGCAP contractor in Somalia, "No one knows better than I the tremendous work that Brown and Root has done in Somalia. The flexibility and competence demonstrated by your employees were key factors in allowing U.S. forces to transition logistical support to the U.N...."

In an environment where the Army's mission "to deter or contain and if not...defeat" is unchanged, but requirements and resources have changed, the Army is forced to realize that the old way of operating is not adaptable to the new environment. What does not change is the need for logistics. Logistics moves the force; a properly fed, clothed and housed force will have the motivation and will to fight. Sun Tzu said of the importance of providing for the troops:

Plunder fertile country to supply the Army with plentiful provisions. Pay heed to nourishing the troops; do not unnecessarily fatigue them. Unite them in spirit; conserve their strength. Make unfathomable plans for the movements of the Army. Throw the troops into a position from which there is no escape and even when faced with death they will not flee.²⁴

Logistics is the bridge connecting a nation's economy to a nation's warfighting forces. It is the process of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces in the execution of military strategy and operations. The art of logistics is how to integrate the strategic operational and

tactical sustainment efforts within the theater, while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of units, personnel and supplies in support of the employment concept of a geographic combatant commander.²⁵

Joint Operation planning is conducted within the chain of command that runs from the National Command Authority (NCA) to the combatant commanders and is primarily the responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. Joint operation planning includes the preparation of operation plans (OPLANs), concept plans (CONPLANs), functional plans, campaign plans and operations orders by joint force commanders, as well as those joint planning activities that support the development of these plans and orders. Joint operation planning is categorized as campaign, deliberate or crisis action planning.

The deliberate planning process prepares for a possible contingency based upon the best available information using forces and resources apportioned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Deliberate planning is conducted principally in peacetime to develop joint operations plans for contingencies identified in strategic planning documents. Crisis action planning (CAP), on the other hand, is based on current events and conducted in time sensitive situations and emergencies using assigned, attached, and allocated forces and resources. Crisis action planners follow prescribed CAP procedures that parallel deliberate planning, but are more flexible and responsive to changing events.

Campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes.

Depending on the scope of contemplated operations, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning and continues through crisis action planning.²⁶

Contractors typically are used to provide life support, weapon systems support, and other technical services. The common denominator in all of these efforts is that contractors are asked to provide direct support to our military forces worldwide, including those in forward deployed locations. The JFC does not have the option of going to war (or a military operation other than war) with an all-military team. Someone must plan for the integration of civilian assets into the total force structure... The battlefields of the future will be distinctly different from those of the past. Soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen will have more advanced weapon systems, greater access to information, and increased quality of life. They also will share the battlefield with a greater number of civilians. The increased civilian presence will result from growing reliance on Department of Defense (DOD) civilian employees and contractors to perform combat support and combat service support (CS and CSS) functions. But a greater role for civilians raises an important question: How do we integrate contractors into the commander's operation plan (OPLAN)? The success of contractors on the battlefield requires cooperation, support, and advance planning from the joint force commander's (JFC's) staff.²⁷

LOGCAP's statement of work (SOW) considers joint doctrine. The US Army Materiel Command (USAMC) umbrella contract SOW consists of several planning requirements: the Worldwide Management Plan (WMP) describes how the contractor intends to carry out his prescribed tasks. The Program Manager (PM) for LOGCAP and the contractor have developed generic plans that can be tailored to specific requirements. These include:

- Generic Undeveloped Country Management Plan
- Generic Developed Country Management Plan

- Regional Management Plans
- > MACOM and ASCC Specific Plans

The generic plans provide the baseline for contractor support and can be tailored to meet specific requirements for the Army, other services and agencies. LOGCAP provides a generic capability plan for receiving, housing, and sustaining 25,000 troops in eight base camps for 180 days. Fifteen days after notification, the contractor is required to receive and support 1,500 troops per day. Thirty days after notification, the contractor is required to support 25,000 troops in one rear and seven forward base camps for up to 180 days with options to increase the size of the supported force to 50,000 troops beyond 180 days. Support for these camps may include, but not be limited to:

- Billeting
- Dining facilities and food preparation
- Potable water and Sanitation
- Showers and bath
- Laundry
- > Transportation
- Utilities

In addition to facilities services and logistical support services, LOGCAP may also provide contingency equipment and labor pools to perform noncombatant missions such as support to arriving forces at aerial ports of debarkation (APODS) and seaports of debarkation (SPODs).²⁸

LOGCAP supports the requirements of Joint Pub 5.0 by providing for participation in deliberate, crisis action and campaign planning. LOGCAP's generic support plans provide a baseline for the planner to determine specific LOGCAP support requirements. LOGCAP's team of planners includes: the PM LOGCAP, the AMC Worldwide Logistic Support Element (LSE) including LSE Europe, LSE Far East and LSE CONUS, the USACE, DCMCI, CINC/MACOM team representatives, contractor and most recently, the LOGCAP Support Unit (LSU). The LSU is a United States Army Reserve Unit (USAR) activated in October 1999 with 66 drilling members. The LSU is commanded by a Colonel and consists of mainly majors and lieutenant colonels. It has seven active reserve positions. LOGCAP team members coordinate with MACOMs to identify requirements and MACOM exercises that may be opportunities for LOGCAP participation. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) authorizes funding for contractor developed plans and exercises. Team members review OPLANS and program requirements and determine which requirements and CS/CSS functions can and should be accomplished by LOGCAP. They coordinate with MACOMs to develop LOGCAP support plans to incorporate contractor augmentation support into OPLANs. All aspects of contractor involvement are reflected in OPLANs to permit rapid integration of LOGCAP support into the force as required.

This logistics concept also considers deployment, employment, sustainment and redeployment planning. By participating in exercises allowed in every MACOM area of responsibility (AOR), whether "Agile Lion" in EUCOM, "Ulchi Fosus Lens," Reception, Staging, Onward-movement, and Integration

("RSO&I"), "Cobra Gold" or "Tempest Express" in PACOM or "Blue Advance" and "Fuertes Defensas" in SOUTHCOM, LOGCAP trains with units. Funded by DA DCSLOG, LOGCAP participation in these exercises demonstrates contractor capabilities and provides the commander with the opportunity to develop an important "habitual relationship" with the contractor.

AR 715-10 requires MACOMs to identify current and planned voids in CS/CSS functions our existing force structure cannot adequately provide, appropriate for augmentation by contracted support service personnel. It further requires MACOMs to include contract support services in all deliberate and crisis action plans and operational orders for which they are proponent. It further requires MACOMs to review all deliberate and crisis action plans, operational orders, and program requirements to formulate a global strategy for acquiring certain commercial battlefield support service capabilities during wartime and operations-other-than-war. The resulting strategy and support services personnel resources should then be incorporated into all deliberate and crisis action plans, operational orders, and program requirements.

LOGCAP CAN HELP MINIMIZE THE U.S. LOGISTICS "FOOTPRINT"

Against the backdrop of bloodshed in East Timor, President Clinton told the United Nations on Tuesday that he hopes the U.S. and other nations, through "shared responsibility," can better protect victims of ethnic violence. But he cautioned, "We cannot do everything everywhere....I know that some are troubled that the United States and others cannot respond to every humanitarian catastrophe in the world," Clinton said. "It is easy to say, 'Never again' but much harder to make it so. Promising too much can be as cruel as caring too little."

Americans did go to East Timor, but with an exit strategy. The exit strategy was built around providing certain "unique services" until those services could be taken over by another participating country or by a contractor. LTC Andy Smith is AMC LOGCAP's Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) on the ground. His job is to remain in East Timor until the United Nations assumes the peacekeeping mission. His presence along with the contractor allowed most U.S. forces to leave in mid-December and most to be home by Christmas. LTC Smith is quoted in AUSA magazine, "LOGCAP frees soldiers from jobs they don't need to be doing or that we might not want Americans doing, which allows commanders to minimize the U.S. footprint." ³¹ This is what LOGCAP and contractors do best to support the force. Using LOGCAP in humanitarian or peacekeeping operations where the military wishes to limit the number of uniformed forces is one of the most efficient use of this force multiplier.

THE CHALLENGE

Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3020.37 states, "The DOD components shall rely on the most effective mix of the total force, cost and other factors considered, including active, reserve, civilian, host nation, and contract resources necessary to fulfill assigned peacetime and wartime missions."

Joint doctrine requires planning through its Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) for

strategic direction and through its Joint Planning and Execution System (JOPES) for deliberate and crisis action planning. To reap the benefits of contractor support, planning for contractor capabilities should begin at these levels. To make the best possible use of contractor resources, especially LOGCAP, we must include LOGCAP planners and the contractor in the process. James Althouse wrote in his article, "Contractors on the Battlefield: "What Doctrine Says and Doesn't Say" that "the key to supporting the Force XXI Army is a seamless logistics support system covering the whole spectrum of logistics, from the strategic to the operational to the tactical level. Although the tactical level usually is seen as the location of a direct contractor presence on the battlefield, decisions must be made about contractor involvement at each level to determine what, if any, support is needed in the field. Strategic logistics decisions involve determining support requirements and coordinating with the industrial base. Operational logistics ties the strategic and tactical levels together through preparation of the theater and establishment of the support base. Tactical logistics decisions establish who is going to work where on the battlefield. Contractor involvement must be considered in all of these decisions."³³

REDUCE THE CONTRACTOR "FOOTPRINT" IN A THEATER OF OPERATIONS

In the past, host nation activities, non-governmental organizations, the United Nations, local contracting offices, the Corps of Engineers, Defense Contract Management Command, Military Traffic Command and supporting commands with their own contracting staff all are authorized to set up contracting offices in the theater of operations. Each is trying to provide logistic support by purchasing or obtaining services from local resources. Even though the new doctrine establishes a management structure, it is hard to imagine how a commander, even with delegation of authority to a Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC) and establishing an Acquisition Review Board, can efficiently manage a multiplicity of different contracting offices in theater. In his insightful article, "Planning: the key to Contractors on the Battlefield," David Young recommends maintaining organizational simplicity and unity of command by using the services of Army Materiel Command (AMC), the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) and the Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to manage contracts. Doing so will help the Joint Force Commander (JFC) consolidate oversight functions, reduce duplication of effort and reduce the number of support personnel required in theater. "Minimize the number of contractors," Young recommends, "one contractor with several thousand employees is easier to manage than a hundred small contractor with a few employees each." 34 This appears to be the better solution and LOGCAP is the best choice.

LOGCAP AUGMENTS THE FORCE IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

LOGCAP has demonstrated its ability to excel in a number of humanitarian operations by supporting the force in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, Macedonia and East Timor. LOGCAP has supported all services and United Nations forces. It has participated successfully in disaster relief operations.

A good example is LOGCAP support in Haiti where the plan for forced entry quickly changed and instead of engaging in combat, thousands of soldiers suddenly became peacekeepers. Without having to execute a forcible entry operation, unit commanders immediately focused their attention on improving living conditions of their soldiers and expediting the return of combat service support units to the United States. Within sixty days, more than 500 Brown and Root personnel were in Haiti supporting 15,000 soldiers. In less than sixty more days, 13, 867 troops were being fed from the new dining facilities, more than 150,000 gallons of potable water were produced and delivered daily, and 200 supply requests and been received for items ranging from pallets to paper plates. There were more than 3.5 million gallons of fuel on-hand, as the contractor pumped in excess of 40,000 gallons to customers. Contractor personnel had received and laundered more than 8,000 bundles of laundry, built twenty-six 30 nozzle shower units, completed 12 kitchens, had 29 dining facilities in place, were servicing more than 800 portable toilets, and were removing mountains of trash."

CONCLUSION

Peacetime preparation is vital to using contractors successfully. Military senior leaders must begin to think of both systems and contingency contractors as part of the revolution in military affairs. This is not only recognition of technological change including moving systems analysts and maintenance technicians into a theater, this paradigm shift is a part of that "fundamental restructuring of the support structure. It is difficult to make that shift – to think of using civilian contractors strategically. But we must. Strategy, according to David Jablonsky is difficult. In today's changing strategic environment, it involves "grappling with the paradox of preparing for war in peacetime if they wish to maintain the peace." ³⁶ But that is the focus of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program – to help the commander to pre-plan in peacetime for contingencies.

RECOMMENDATION

Make LOGCAP the contract of choice for all contingency operations. The most efficient way to reduce the contracting footprint in theater is to reduce the number of contracting offices and associated entities. Once LOGCAP is deployed in theater, often as early as 72 hours after initial entry, logistics requirements can be smoothly and easily transitioned. The Defense Contract Management Command International accomplishes contingency contract administration (CCAS) for LOGCAP. DCMCI is located in every theater where troops are located or deployed and can often arrive in theater ahead of the contractor. Team LOGCAP deploys in theater with the Program Manager or his representative, the logistic planner and depending on the requirement, the procuring contracting officer to turn over CCAS to DCMCI. Include LOGCAP in MACOM exercises where use of contractors is likely.

Word Count=6424

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Michael Howard, Clausewitz, (Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1983) p.33
- ² U.S. Army Materiel Command <u>Logistics Civil Augmentation Program</u> Pamphlet, AMC 700-30 (Alexandria: 6 December 1997) p 5
 - ³ lbid. p 4.
- ⁴ Raymond Sumser, "Emerging Importance of Civilians and Contractor Employees to the Army," <u>Landpower Essay Series</u>, (Arlington: AUSA 1995) p 2.
- ⁵ Charles R. Shrader, "Contractors on the Battlefield" Landpower Essay Series, (Arlington: AUSA, May 1999) p. 1
- ⁶ James Althouse, "Contractors on the Battlefield: What the Doctrine Says and What it Doesn't Say," <u>Army Logistician.</u> (Fort Lee: Nov/Dec 1998) p 15. Althouse quotes Martin Clevald from <u>Supplying War</u>.
 - ⁷ Ibid. Shrader, p. 8
 - ⁸ James Huston, "Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953" as quoted by Shrader. p 8
 - 9 Shrader, p 9
 - ¹⁰ Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-10-2, (Washington: 1999) p 13
- ¹¹ Joe Fortner and Ron Jaeckle, "Institutionalizing Contractors on the Battlefield," <u>Army Logistician</u>, (Fort Lee: Nov/Dec 1998) p. 11
 - 12 Shrader
 - 13 Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-10-2
 - 14 Ibid
 - 15 Ibid
 - 16 Shrader
 - 17 Ibid
 - 18 lbid. Field Manual 100-10-2
- ¹⁹ William Clinton, <u>A National Security Strategy for a New Century</u>, (Washington: The White House, December 1999)
 - ²⁰ National Military Strategy, (Washington: 1997) p 7
 - ²¹ Ibid

- David Young, "Planning: The Key to Contractors on the Battlefield," <u>Army Logistician</u>, (Fort Lee: May/June 1999) p 10. Quoted in headnote of article.
 - ²³ Ibid. National Military Strategy.
 - ²⁴ Samuel Griffith, <u>Sun Tzu: The Art of War,</u> (Great Britain, Oxford University Press, 1963) p.134.
- ²⁵ Department of Defense, <u>Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations</u>, Joint Publication 4.0, (Washington: 27 January 1995) p. v
- 26 Department of Defense, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, Joint Pub 5.0 (Washington: 13 April 1995) p.ix
- ²⁷ David Young, "Planning:: The Key to Contractors on the Battlefield" <u>Army Logistician</u>, (Fort Lee: May/June 1999) p 11
 - ²⁸ Ibid. AMC Pamphlet 700-30 p.10
 - ²⁹ Ibid. p 12
 - ³⁰ (The Times Mirror Company; Los Angeles Times 1999)
 - ³¹ Dennis Steele, "End State" <u>Army,</u> (Arlington: AUSA February 2000)
- 32 Department of Defense Instruction 3020.37, "Continuation of Essential Services During Crisis" (Washington: 1999)
 - 33 Ibid. Althouse, p.15
 - 34 Young
- ³⁵ Mike Kelley, "Deploying a Contingency Support Team" <u>Army Logistician</u>, (Fort Lee: Jan/Feb 1996) p. 12-13
- ³⁶ David Jablonsky, "Why is Strategy Difficult?" U.S.Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, (Carlisle Barracks:September 30, 1992) p 67.

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